Bonin seems ill at ease. Suddenly, a strange aroma, like an electrical transformer, floods the cockpit, and the temperature suddenly increases. Unfortunately, the vast majority of pilots will have little experience in finding the answers. The nose remains high.At last, Bonin tells the others the crucial fact whose import he has so grievously failed to understand himself. Therefore, Bonin may have assumed that the stall warning was spurious because he didn't realize that the plane could remove its own restrictions against stalling and, indeed, had done so.Another of the pitot tubes begins to function once more. These have the potential to remove a great deal of uncertainty and danger from aviation.
Throughout, Bonin will keep pulling back on the stick, the exact opposite of what he must do to recover from the stall. Though the pitot tubes are now fully functional, the forward airspeed is so low—below 60 knots—that the angle-of-attack inputs are no longer accepted as valid, and the stall-warning horn temporarily stops. As the plane approaches 10,000 feet, Robert tries to take back the controls, and pushes forward on the stick, but the plane is in "dual input" mode, and so the system averages his inputs with those of Bonin, who continues to pull back. Instead, we tend to revert to the familiar and the well-rehearsed. Black box revelations from the June 2009 crash paint a surprising picture of chaos in the cockpit that led to one of aviation's greatest mysteries. Then the sound of slipstream suddenly becomes louder. A stall is a potentially dangerous situation that can result from flying too slowly. The plane At 2:20 a.m., the Air Traffic Controller at DAKAR failed to contact Air France Flight 447, which was supposed to be in DAKAR airspace already. "When you have a captain and a first officer in the cockpit, it's clear who's in charge," Nutter explains.
The cockpit's avionics are now all functioning normally.
No one mentions the word "stall." But it is still descending at a precipitous angle. "They were probably experiencing some pretty wild gyrations," Esser says. Within 15 minutes, everyone aboard the plane will be dead. Other searches in 2009 and 2010 also found nothing. In the meantime Robert has been examining the radar system and has found that it has not been set up in the correct mode. (Salpu and Tasil are two air-traffic-position reporting points.) Aside from the loss of airspeed indication, everything is working fine. The vast majority of the time, the computer operates within what's known as normal law, which means that the computer will not enact any control movements that would cause the plane to leave its flight envelope. Bonin's behavior is difficult for professional aviators to understand. "Their stick doesn't move just because the other one does, unlike the old-fashioned mechanical systems like you find in small planes, where if you turn one, the [other] one turns the same way." At a critical speed, a wing suddenly becomes much less effective at generating lift, and a plane can plunge precipitously. The flight crew has all the information that they need to fly safely, and all the systems are fully functional. If they could fly a perfectly good plane into the ocean, then what airline could plausibly say, "Our pilots would never do that"? It took about two years, the 12th of May 2011, for the ^black boxes with the digital record of the flight data (DDR) and the For a moment, the co-pilots are in control of the airplane. He pulls back on the side stick to put the airplane into a steep climb, despite having recently discussed the fact that the plane could not safely ascend due to the unusually high external temperature. The controller then contacted Air France, who tried to contact Flight 447, but failed.As the search for survivors end, the search for the plane's recorders then began.
They are failing, essentially, to cooperate. But he is not at sea level; he is in the far thinner air of 37,500 feet. The problems that occur from this point forward are entirely due to human error.Bonin's statement here offers a crucial window onto his reasoning. Otelli reports that many airline pilots (and, indeed, he himself) subsequently flew a simulation of the flight from this point and were able to do so without any trouble. Robert has no idea that, despite their conversation about descending, Bonin has continued to pull back on the side stick. This may give the pilots the impression that their situation is improving, when in fact it signals just the reverse.Another of the revelations of Otelli's transcript is that the captain of the flight makes no attempt to physically take control of the airplane. At 2:02 am, the captain leaves the flight deck to take a nap. From now on, every airline pilot will no doubt think immediately of AF447 the instant a stall-warning alarm sounds at cruise altitude. While the airplane's avionics track crucial parameters such as location, speed, and heading, the human beings can pay attention to something else. It is not clear to either one of them who is responsible for what, and who is doing what. 01 June 2009 - Air France 447: The aircraft departed from Rio de Janeiro-Galeão International Airport on 31 May 2009 at 19:29 local time (22:29 UTC), with a scheduled arrival at Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport at 10:03 the following day. Robert notices Bonin's error and tries to correct him. The pilots likely never understood that the only problem they had was that the airspeed was incorrect.