The median overcharge achieved by cartels is 20 percent of selling price. Bitte versuchen Sie es später noch einmal.Wir konnten Ihre Stimmabgabe leider nicht speichern. Rigorous, yet broadly accessible to those serious about antitrust analysis, these thoughtful and thought-provoking "Lectures" offer a synthetic survey of and distinctive perspective on each of the subjects addressed." Michael D. Whinston is Robert E. and Emily H. King Professor of Business Institutions in the Department of Economics at Northwestern University. Ihre zuletzt angesehenen Artikel und besonderen Empfehlungen This complexity is ‘‘both legal and economic inis demonstrated in the book, using a simple numerical example based onMankiw and Whinston (1986)], this possibility appears rathemost instances. These lectures are intended to serve as an introduction to the economics behind antitrust policies. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, London 2006. XII, 249 pp. He focuses on three areas: price fixing, in which competitors agree to restrict output or raise price; horizontal mergers, in which competitors agree to merge their operations; and exclusionary vertical contracts, in which a competitor seeks to exclude a rival.
The results show that on average these cartel overcharges are significantly larger than the criminal fines of either the European Union or the United States. This model also allows for a more detailed analysis of the most important determi-nants of the optimal degree of rule-differentia¬tion. Michael D. Whinston’s Lectures on Antitrust Economics, reviewed by Robert E. Hall Whinston’s elegant volume, derived from lectures given at Torcuato University in Argentina, drills into three important topics in competition policy: collusion, mergers, and exclusive contracts. Um aus diesem Karussell zu navigieren, benutzen Sie bitte Ihre Überschrift-Tastenkombination, um zur nächsten oder vorherigen Überschrift zu navigieren.Deceptive buying - Cannot download to Kindle device --Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick Professor of Business, Columbia Business School " Whinston offers great clarity, penetrating analysis, and fresh insights at the cutting edge of antitrust economics. * Loriot, Guillaume & François Rouxel, GE/Instrumentarium: A Practical Example Of The Use Of Quantitative Analyses In Merger Control (Spring, 2004) Competition Policy Newsletter. I cannot think of a better introduction to antitrust economics and policy. In these lectures Michael Whinston offers an accessible and lucid account of the economics behind antitrust law, looking at some of the most recent developments in antitrust economics and highlighting areas that require further research. Markets where cartels have high market shares tend to have higher overcharges. 21 0 obj <> endobj For my surprise, after the buying I was told the book could only be read on computer or iphone, but not in the Kindle device itself. Bitte versuchen Sie es später noch einmal.Wir konnten Ihre Stimmabgabe leider nicht speichern. Whinstonbrilliantly manages to simplify the otherwise rather difficult models to anextent that they are very comprehensible for the reader even though the levelof formal analysis in this chapter is a bit more demanding than in the rest ofexclusive contracts, including a nice presentation of the Chicago School’sone-monopoly-rent argument, and the chapter also providesdiscussion of pro-competitive effects and the conditions undermay arise (e.g., whether investments are complementary or substitutable innature and whether they are undertaken by buyers or sellers). Whinston's discussion seeks to unsettle this view, suggesting that some fundamental issues in this area are, in fact, not well understood. Nachdem Sie Produktseiten oder Suchergebnisse angesehen haben, finden Sie hier eine einfache Möglichkeit, diese Seiten wiederzufinden.Nachdem Sie Produktseiten oder Suchergebnisse angesehen haben, finden Sie hier eine einfache Möglichkeit, diese Seiten wiederzufinden.Wählen Sie ein Land/eine Region für Ihren Einkauf.
To be more precise, the optimalchoice between per se rules and a rule-of-reason approach minimizes theweighted sum of these costs (with the probabilities of the two errors asweights), taking into account the costs of obtaining and processing relevantinformation. After introducing the notion of a continuum of more or less differentiated rules, we show - based upon law and economics literature upon the optimal complexity of rules - in a simple model that a competition rule is optimally differentiated, if the marginal reduction of the sum of error costs (as the marginal benefit of differentiation) equals the marginal costs of differen-tiation. Very good book.