It was found that the tailwind was 8 knots and exceeded the required limit of 5 knots. It was found that braking action reports varied significantly based on aircraft type, changing weather conditions, personnel experience, the type of equipment used, and the time of report, and therefore shouldn’t be used as conclusive information on runway conditions. 0000200405 00000 n Introduction. When interviewed company pilots revealed that they too either didn’t adhere to the mixed braking policy or weren’t aware of it. 0000121850 00000 n 0000200456 00000 n 0000197815 00000 n 0000031816 00000 n 0000163167 00000 n 0000194841 00000 n 0000183840 00000 n The The 737 skidded during landing; subsequently, witnesses said the As the Boeing 737-700 is a "Next Generation" model, the aircraft was equipped with the latest anti-skid and braking technology. 0000185309 00000 n Examination of the reverser system found no evidence of malfunction. 0000195866 00000 n However investigators found that the controller didn’t give the pilots all the required braking action reports available because he didn’t take into account the aircraft type from which the reports came from. 0000197406 00000 n 0000196593 00000 n He elected to use manual braking and applied full brake pressure. 0000192299 00000 n 0000185928 00000 n 0000122462 00000 n 0000188581 00000 n 0000187497 00000 n It was found that the pilots were unaware of these assumptions and that Southwest hadn’t provided sufficient recurrent training on them. 0000187644 00000 n 0000200968 00000 n 0000189371 00000 n Contributing to the accident were Southwest Airlines’ 1) failure to provide its pilots with clear and consistent guidance and training regarding company policies and procedures related to arrival landing distance calculations; 2) programming and design of its on board performance computer, which did not present critical assumption information despite inconsistent tailwind and reverse thrust assessment methods; 3) plan to implement new autobrake procedures without a familiarization period; and 4) failure to include a margin of safety in the arrival assessment to account for operational uncertainties.
0000199861 00000 n 0000184755 00000 n 0000008236 00000 n 0000201151 00000 n 0000196225 00000 n 0000186518 00000 n 0000156298 00000 n
The captain was 59-year-old Bruce Sutherland, who had been a former U.S. Air Force pilot.
0000199912 00000 n The report noted that Southwest had only very recently begun actually using the The NTSB preliminary report determined that the aircraft touched down in the touchdown zone of the runway with 4,500 feet (1,400 m) of its 6,522-foot (1,988 m) length remaining; under the prevailing conditions of weather, wind, speed, and weight, the aircraft needed 5,300 feet (1,600 m) of runway to stop safely. 0000193074 00000 n The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was the pilots’ failure to use available reverse thrust in a timely manner to safely slow or stop the airplane after landing, which resulted in a runway overrun. 0000192870 00000 n It's even listed in the external links.) It was found that the tailwind was 8 knots and exceeded the required limit of 5 knots. 0000198006 00000 n
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The first officer was 34-year-old Steven Oliver, who had been working for the Airline since February 2003, having previously served as a captain for Captain Sutherland was the pilot flying (PF) and first officer Oliver was the pilot monitoring (PM).A south easterly wind would normally favor landing into the wind on runway 13 Center. 0000187278 00000 n 0000008569 00000 n 0000188425 00000 n 0000193023 00000 n 0000186561 00000 n On December 8, 2005, about 1914 central standard time, Southwest Airlines (SWA) flight 1248, a Boeing 737-7H4, N471WN, ran off the departure end of runway 31 center (31C) after landing at Chicago Midway International Airport (MDW), Chicago, Illinois. However investigators determined that the OPC based its stopping margins on 2 assumptions: first that the tailwind is lower than that during the accident and second that the thrust reversers are deployed on time upon landing. 0000194790 00000 n
0000195120 00000 n 0000010875 00000 n He joined Southwest Airlines in August 1995 and had 15,000 flight hours, including 4,500 hours on the Boeing 737. 0000196931 00000 n 0000198907 00000 n In addition the FOM required pilots to use the worse of mixed runway conditions, as in this case… fair/poor.Taking all the above critical data into account the pilots were required to divert to an alternate and failed to do so. 0000187861 00000 n A search of the NTSB accident/incident database reveals ten runway overrun accidents or incidents since 1982.
0000199404 00000 n 0000189187 00000 n 0000195655 00000 n 0000183621 00000 n 0000194290 00000 n The pilots carried out such an assessment using an onboard personal computer with data and algorithms provided by a third party vendor.However, critical assumptions, specifically the tailwind component of 8 knots, was not used by the computer, inserting the 5 knot tailwind limit imposed in the Flight Operations Manual (FOM). Both full reverse thrust and full wheel braking were applied from then on.Using all available data, and analyzing the flight data recorder, manufacturer’s landing data, and the reported runway conditions worst case of poor, it is true that a safe landing could have been performed.Poor regulation, poor operational procedures, poor training, inadequate computer display of critical information, confusion amongst pilots as to the significance of landing performance calculations, ignorance of published company procedures, and introduction of autobrake without familiarization all contributed to this accident. 0000192057 00000 n 0000191723 00000 n Southwest also hadn’t routinely trained its pilots on following or understanding the mixed braking action report policy, and it wasn’t referenced in the company manuals. 0000015128 00000 n Southwest 1248… 0000184903 00000 n 0000186380 00000 n Southwest Airlines Co. is a major American airline headquartered in Dallas, Texas, and is the world's largest low-cost carrier. 0000189320 00000 n The NTSB accident report highlights major systemic failures, which will be highlighted below. 0000191016 00000 n 0000196542 00000 n 0000125446 00000 n